












Resumo		O	 sucesso	das	 clínicas	 jurídicas	 deve-se	principalmente	 à	 ideia	 de	 que	 elas	podem	 dar	 uma	 conotação	 profissional	 aos	 cursos	 de	 direito,	 enquanto	 a	evocação	 da	 tradição	 realista,	 do	 direito	 em	 ação	 e	 a	 referência	 à	 justiça	social	parecem	relegadas	à	mera	função	de	um	mito	legitimador.	Somente	se	caracterizada	 por	 uma	 opção	 teórica	 precisa	 que	 distingue	 claramente	 o	texto	normativo	da	norma	e	identifique	o	hiato	entre	os	dois	como	o	espaço	do	 jurista,	 as	 clínicas	 jurídicas	 poderão	 estar	 no	 centro	 de	 uma	 mudança	radical	 na	 educação	 jurídica.	Mesmo	 a	 orientação	 para	 a	 justiça	 social	 não	está	 implícita	 em	nenhuma	experiência	 clínica.	 Somente	 configurando	uma	clínica	 jurídica	 como	 um	 laboratório	 para	 os	 alunos	 aprenderem	 a	 usar	fantasia	 jurídica	 para	 transformar	 os	 problemas	 particulares	 de	 pessoas	marginalizadas	em	reivindicações	que	podem	ser	apresentadas	a	um	juiz,	a	clínica	contribui	para	o	acesso	desses	indivíduos	à	justiça.	
Palavras-chave:	 Clínicas	 jurídicas,	 realismo	 jurídico,	 construção	 jurídica,	imaginação	jurídica,	acesso	à	justiça.	
	
Abstract	The	 success	 of	 legal	 clinics	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 they	 can	 give	 a	professionalizing	 connotation	 to	 the	 degree	 courses	 in	 law,	 while	 the	
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evocation	of	the	realist	tradition,	of	law	in	action,	and	the	reference	to	social	justice	 seem	 relegated	 to	 the	mere	 function	 of	 a	 legitimising	myth.	 Only	 if	characterized	 by	 a	 precise	 theoretical	 option	 that	 clearly	 distinguishes	normative	text	 from	norm	and	identifies	the	hiatus	between	the	two	as	the	space	of	the	jurist,	can	legal	clinics	be	at	the	heart	of	a	radical	change	in	legal	education.	Even	 the	orientation	 towards	social	 justice	 is	not	 implicit	 in	any	clinical	 experience.	 Only	 by	 configuring	 a	 legal	 clinic	 as	 a	 laboratory	 for	students	to	learn	how	to	use	legal	fantasy	to	transform	the	private	troubles	of	marginalized	people	into	claims	that	can	be	brought	before	a	judge,	does	the	clinic	contribute	to	these	individuals’	access	to	justice.	
Keywords:	Law	clinic,	Legal	realism,	Legal	construction,	Legal	 imagination,	Access	to	justice.	
	
Introduction		In	 recent	 years,	 the	 law	 courses	 of	 Italian	 universities	 have	 seen	 a	 significant	 spread	 of	experiences	 that	 call	 themselves	 “legal	 clinics”.	 The	 lowest	 common	 denominator	 of	 these	different	 experiences	 is	 a	 didactic	method	of	 law	based	on	 a	 “practical”	 approach,	 aimed	 at	supplementing,	but	usually	not	overcoming,	the	traditional	legal	teaching	of	civil	law	contexts.	This	 trend	 seems	 to	 place	 law	 courses	 within	 what	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 “a	 global	 clinical	movement”	 (Bloch	and	Menon,	2012)2	 focused	on	enhancing	 the	professionalizing	aspect	of	legal	teaching	(a	trend	highlighted,	in	Italy,	also	by	the	recent	inclusion	of	a	semester	of	legal	practice	 in	 the	 curriculum	 of	 a	 master’s	 degree3).	 It	 is	 this	 enhancement	 that	 generally	supports	 the	 claim	 that,	 from	 a	 didactic	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 clinical	 approach	 represents	 a	significant	step	forward.	In	an	era	characterized	by	a	philosophy	of	history	that	sees	the	market	as	the	best	possible	tool	 for	 regulating	 society,	 legal	 clinics	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 teaching	 methodology	 that,	 finally,	aligns	 the	 teaching	 of	 law	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 contemporary	 society.	 At	 a	 time	 when	 public	competitions,	the	traditional	goal	of	law	graduates,	are	becoming	less	and	less	frequent,	legal	clinics	 allow	 legal	 faculties	 to	 attract	 students	 back	 and	 regain	 a	 professionalizing	 role	(Marella	and	Rigo,	2015,	p.	546).	By	 integrating	 clinical-legal	 education	 into	 their	 degree	 programmes,	 Italian	 universities	aspire	 to	 be	 in	 line	with	 US	 degree	 programmes	where,	 since	 the	 1970s,	 legal	 clinics	 have	successfully	spread	to	what	are	considered	to	be	the	top	Law	Schools	(Harvard,	Yale,	Stanford,	
                                                2	 To	 realize	 the	 success	 of	 the	 clinical	 didactic	 approach	 in	 continental	 Europe,	 it	 is	 enough	 to	 remember	 the	 numerous	universities	that	have	activated	legal	clinics.	They	include	Science	Po	(Paris),	Humboldt	(Berlin),	Universidad	Carlos	III	de	Madrid.	On	 the	development	of	 legal	 clinics	 in	 Italy,	 see	 the	 research	by	Clelia	Bartoli	 (2015).	 For	 a	 survey	of	 the	development	of	 the	clinical	 movement	 in	 Europe	 see	 Bartoli	 (2016).	 A	 quick	 overview	 of	 the	 development	 of	 legal	 clinics	 worldwide	 and	 their	polymorphic	character	can	be	found	in	Marella	and	Rigo	(2015,	p.	540-1).	3	 The	 framework	 agreement	 signed	 on	 24	 February	 2017	 between	 the	 Italian	 bar	 and	 the	 directors	 of	 law	 departments	implemented	the	reform	of	the	Italian	legal	profession	(Law	no.	247	of	31	December	2012),	which	in	turn	had	partially	modified	the	ways	of	carrying	out	the	traineeship	for	accessing	the	profession.	Now	a	law	student	in	her	final	year	can	carry	out	a	semester	of	 legal	 practice	 as	 part	 of	 the	 curriculum,	 thus	 anticipating	 part	 of	 the	 18	months	 traineeship	 that,	 originally,	 could	 only	 be	carried	out	after	graduating.	The	agreement	provides	that	the	trainee’s	professional	guarantees,	under	the	supervision	of	the	bar,	the	effectiveness	of	 training,	 encouraging	 the	 student’s	participation	 in	hearings,	 in	 the	drafting	of	documents	and	 in	 research	functional	to	preparing	cases.	
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Columbia,	NYU,	Cornell,	 etc.).	According	 to	 a	 recent	 survey	 conducted	 for	 the	Center	 for	 the	
Study	of	Applied	Legal	Education	 by	R.R.	Kuehn	and	D.A.	 Santacroce	 (www.csale.org),	 in	 the	society	considered	as	the	model	par	excellence	of	a	dynamic	organization	capable	of	keeping	up	with	 the	market,	 in	 the	 academic	 year	 2016/2017	 there	were	 1433	 active	 legal	 clinics,	distributed	in	187	Law	Schools,	with	an	average	of	7	clinics	for	each	of	them.	The	success	of	legal	clinics	is	therefore	linked,	in	the	first	place,	to	their	offering	themselves	as	 the	 response	 of	 law	 degree	 courses	 to	 the	 social	 pressure	 –	 supported	 /	 fuelled	 by	 the	universities	themselves	–	which	calls	for	training	to	“produce”	jurists	able	to	quickly	enter	the	professional	world.	 In	 Italy,	 and	 in	Europe	 in	general,	 this	pressure	has	been	elected	as	 the	pivot	of	the	so-called	Bologna	Process,	which	marks	the	shift	of	university	courses	from	places	institutionally	responsible	for	the	development	of	a	knowledge	and	“culture”	not	intended	for	their	 commercialisation	but	aimed	at	 the	overall	 improvement	of	 social	 life,	 to	 locations	 for	the	production	of	professionalizing	knowledge.	The	university	system	is	no	longer	conceived	as	 aimed	 firstly	 at	 the	production	of	 a	 social	 good,	 but	 as	 an	 endowment,	 a	wealth,	 private,	exclusive,	to	be	sold	on	the	labour	market.4	In	universities	that	have	undergone	this	dramatic	twist,	 legal	 clinics	 are	 the	 ideal	 tool	 of	 law	 degree	 courses	 that	 must	 no	 longer	 present	themselves	 as	 “mere”	 (sic!)	 producers	 of	 knowledge,	 but	 must	 above	 all	 provide	 ‘skills’,	abilities	or	competences,	vaguely	supported	by	 ‘values’	(the	use	of	quotes	 is	meant	to	stress	that	the	model	 is	clearly	American).	They	seem	capable	of	compensating	for	the	tendency	of	law	graduates	to	claim,	upon	entering	the	legal	profession,	that	all	they	have	studied	is	useless	(except,	some	of	 them,	realizing	 later	on	the	 importance	of	what	 they	have	 learned,	but	 this	late	revaluation	does	not	find	much	room	in	the	dominant	rhetoric).		
The	rhetoric	of	legal	realism	and	“social	justice”		If	on	a	practical	level	the	spread	of	legal	clinics	is	due	to	their	appearance	as	the	tool	that,	finally,	also	allows	legal	teachings	to	be	in	line	with	the	idea	of	a	professionalizing	university,	on	 a	 rhetorical	 level	 they	 refer	 to	 the	 legal-realist	 approach	 and	 claim	 an	 “ontological”	vocation	 to	 social	 justice,	 understood	 as	 facilitating	 access	 to	 justice	by	 subjects	 considered	“marginal”.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	Maria	Rosaria	Marella	and	Enrica	Rigo	(2015,	p.	537-8)	open	their	article	–	meant	to	give	a	positive	evaluation	of	legal	clinics,	if	not	of	their	specific	experiences	at	least	of	their	underlying	project	idea	–	with	the	description	of	a	heroic	event	in	the	jagged	story	of	the	“global	clinical	movement”.	The	event,	narrated	in	the	form	of	a	novel	by	Brandt	Goldstein	in	Storming	the	Court:	How	a	Band	of	Yale	Law	Students	Fought	the	President	–	and	
Won,	 is	the	undertaking	of	some	Yale	students	who,	 in	the	early	1990s,	decided	to	bring	the	President	of	the	United	States	to	trial	for	the	forced	returns	that	prevented	Haitian	refugees,	detained	at	the	Guantanamo	base	in	violation	of	any	habeas	corpus	rule,	from	seeking	asylum.	The	story	tells	how,	under	the	guidance	of	a	Yale	professor,	Harold	H.	Koh,	and	with	the	help	
                                                4	On	these	issues,	see	the	important	article	on	legal	clinics	by	Maria	Rosaria	Marella	and	Enrica	Rigo	(2015)	which	concludes	by	claiming	the	social	value	of	culture	and	teaching	and	proposing	to	consider	legal	clinics	a	common	good.	
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before,	by	Rudolf	von	Jhering	who,	in	1884,	wrote:	“We	dissect	legal	cases	as	great	anatomists	would	 do;	 and	we	make	 diagnoses	 as	 doctors	 do	when	 they	 are	 next	 to	 the	 sick’s	 bed.	 But	where	should	we	acquire	such	a	legal-medical	culture	if	not	in	a	legal	clinic?”.	In	support	of	the	founding	myth	of	legal	clinics,	it	can	be	argued	that	there	is	some	affinity	–	 a	 common	 sensitivity	 –	 between	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 interests,	 which	 developed	 from	Jhering’s	 views,	 and	 American	 realism.	 The	 connection	 between	 clinical	 didactics	 and	 legal	realism,	and	with	it	the	link	with	an	attention	to	the	disadvantaged’s	access	to	justice,	appears	less	 tenable	when	we	consider	 that	 in	 Italy	 the	 first	 to	hope	and	urge	 the	 spread	of	 clinical	teaching	 of	 law	 was	 Francesco	 Carnelutti,	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 “systematic”	 or	 “historical-dogmatic”	 school.	 Tracing	 his	 profile,	 Giovanni	 Tarello,	 the	 greatest	 Italian	 legal	 realist,	dismissed	 the	 connection	 between	 clinical	 approach	 and	 concern	 for	 the	 disadvantaged’s	access	 to	 justice,	 writing	 that	 Carnelutti	 excelled	 in	 the	 profession	 of	 lawyer	 “in	 which	 he	earned	the	reputation	of	man	not	disinterested”.	Tarello	(1977)	went	on	to	point	out	that:		 Carnelutti’s	 contribution	 to	 criminal	 disciplines	 had	 a	 clearly	 formalistic	character,	and	its	role	was	supportive	of	that	of	the	“technical-juridical”	school	and	 absolutely	 inserted	 in	 the	 political	 tendency	 of	 the	 fascist	 regime.	 The	latter	 aimed	 at	 discrediting	 non-formal	 criminal	 sciences	with	 a	 sociological	method,	to	the	advantage	of	a	criminal	policy	of	authoritarian	conception,	and	at	discouraging,	 from	the	academic	point	of	view,	non-technical-legal	 studies	on	the	criminal	sanction.		To	clear	the	field	of	any	misunderstanding,	Tarello	(1977)	recalls	that	the	course	of	studies,	inspired	by	the	“general	theory	of	law”	developed	by	Carnelutti	in	the	1930s,	“has	been	called	(unhappily,	because	the	name	creates	confusion	with	other	and	more	significant	movements	of	legal	culture)	‘realistic’	or	‘naturalistic’.	In	Carnelutti’s	idea	–	in	fact	–	[...]	rules	are	arranged	in	 a	 structure	 immanent	 in	 every	 legal	 system,	 a	 structure	 that	 the	 jurist	 ‘discovers’	 as	 the	natural	scientist”	In	 1934,	 therefore	 in	 the	 same	 years	 of	 Frank’s	 article,	 Carnelutti	 published	 an	 essay	entitled	 “Law	Clinic”,	 in	which,	 in	 line	with	his	 theoretical	position,	 the	 legal-realistic	aspect	had	no	role,	nor	had	attention	to	social	justice,	while	the	professionalizing	aspect	was	central.	The	opportunity	to	adapt	the	medical	clinic	method	to	the	study	of	law	was	not	seen	as	a	way	of	 questioning	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 European	 continental	 tradition,	 let	 alone	 its	 social	structure,	 but	 as	 a	 way	 of	 beginning	 to	 meet	 the	 prospective	 jurists’	 need	 for	 a	 practical	training	ground.	Carnelutti,	just	like	Jhering	and	Frank,	noted	in	fact	that,	like	the	doctor,	the	jurist	 is	called	to	solve	problems	that	 in	real	 life	affect	and	often	afflict	man.	But	“unlike	the	future	 doctor,	 the	 future	 jurist,	 as	 long	 as	 he	 remains	 in	 the	 university,	 never	 comes	 into	contact	with	that	real	whose	possession	is	the	ultimate	goal	of	his	culture”	(Carnelutti	1935,	p.	169-70).	There	is	another	reason	for	the	persistence	of	the	generic,	and	normally	purely	rhetorical,	reference	to	the	legal-realist	matrix	that	characterizes	the	clinical	approach	to	law	today.	It	is	its	allowing	legal	clinics	to	present	themselves	as	a	didactic	as	well	as	a	professionalizing	tool,	
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capable	of	adapting	the	teaching	of	law	to	the	proclaimed	–	and	over-proclaimed	–	crisis	of	the	system	of	legal	sources	and	its	hierarchical	arrangement.	At	a	time	when	the	teaching	of	law	in	books,	traditionally	focused	on	the	sources	and	their	hierarchy,	appears	to	be	delegitimised	by	the	 impossibility	 of	 relying	 on	 an	 ordered	 picture	 of	 the	 legal	 sources,	 the	 reference	 to	 the	legal-realist	 tradition	 allows	 the	 clinical	 approach	 to	 present	 itself	 as	 an	 effective	 tool	 to	overcome	the	current	dyscrasia	between	codified	law	and	living	law.	The	emergence	of	the	clinical	approach	and	the	valorisation	of	law	in	action	against	that	in	books	–	better,	in	normative	texts	–	is	certainly	favoured	by	today’s	context.	This	is	marked	by	the	 growing	 emergence	 of	what	 is	 confusedly	 defined	 as	 soft	 law	 and	 by	 the	 prevalence	 of	nonconforming	implementation	practices,	sometimes	considered,	in	particular	by	legislators,	arbitrary	 or	 illegitimate	 (in	 this	 rhetoric	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 the	 Courts’	constitutionally	 oriented	 readings	 of	 normative	 texts	 from	 delegification).	 The	 crisis	 of	 the	Enlightenment	 myth	 of	 a	 complete	 legal	 system	 capable	 of	 performing	 an	 all-regulatory	function,	as	in	Bentham’s	dream	of	the	pannomion,	 leads	to	a	didactics	valuing	legal	practice	and	contrasting	normative	texts	with	living	law.	But	the	‘discovery’	of	the	clinical	method	is	not	intended	to	call	into	question	the	normative	and	formalist	approach	which,	 in	continental	Europe,	has	characterised	the	approach	to	 law	since	 the	 time	of	 the	Napoleonic	Code.	The	configuration	 that	 the	 legal	 clinics	are	 taking	on	reveals	the	underlying	belief	that	this	situation	is	contingent.	The	idea	and	hope	are	clear	that	we	will	soon	be	able	to	restore	the	coherence	and	hierarchy	of	the	system	of	sources,	so	that	clinical	teaching	will	no	longer	have	to	deal	with	theoretical	problems,	something	it	does	not	seem	to	have	been	designed	for,	but	will	simply	carry	out	the	professionalising	task	that	is	its	own	and	is	considered	today	an	indispensable	pivot	of	legal	teaching.	As	said,	the	“law	in	action”	approach	of	 learning	by	doing	is	in	fact	reduced	to	the	goal	of	making	students	acquire	professional	skills,	 the	 ‘craftsmanship’	of	subsuming	a	specific	case	under	 a	 general	 rule.	 This	 approach	 is	 somehow	 implicit	 in	 the	medical	 analogy.	 The	 ‘legal	clinic’	 follows	 the	 lines	of	 the	 ‘clinics’	 of	medical	 courses:	doctors’	 clinical	practice	does	not	call	medical	science	 into	question,	 just	as	 legal	practice	should	not	call	 into	question	 jurists’	traditional	conceptual	apparatus,	“legal	science”.	Medical	students,	after	learning	anatomy	and	pathological	 anatomy	 in	 manuals	 in	 their	 freshman	 years,	 go	 to	 hospitals	 where	 “clinical”	courses	allow	them	to	gain	field	experience	and	professionalism,	to	be	ready	to	be	“doctors”	(Carnelutti,	1934).	After	studying	normative	texts,	prospective	 jurists	 learn	how	to	subsume	cases	by	working	on	them	with	practitioners.	Emblematic	of	this	reduction	of	the	legal	clinical	approach	 to	 professionalisation	 is	 the	 emphasis	 on	 “lawyering”,	 a	 term	which,	 according	 to	the	 Collins	 Dictionary,	 means	 in	 American	 English	 “the	 profession	 of	 being	 a	 lawyer;	 the	practice	 of	 law”.	 Identifying	 the	 educational	 content	 of	 clinics	 in	 lawyering	 is,	 therefore,	 to	implicitly	 reduce	 the	practice	 of	 law,	 law	 in	 action,	 to	 the	practice	 of	 the	 legal	 professional.	This	 reduction	 is	 also	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Italian	 translations	 of	 the	 term,	 which	 portray	 the	
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practical	skills	it	indicates	as:	“interviews	with	clients,	examination	of	facts,	study	of	solutions	and	defensive	strategies,	drafting	of	petitions,	procedural	documents	and	pleadings”.5	That	the	realist	connotation	is	merely	rhetorical	and	superficial	and	has	no	impact	on	the	background	 conception	 of	 law	 taught	 in	 universities	 is	 confirmed	 by	 clinical	 teaching	 often	consisting	 in	 practices	 of	 simulation	 of	 legal	 activities	 and	 in	 the	 study	 of	 judicial	 cases.	 In	many	 clinical	 experiences,	 in	 fact,	 the	 direct	 contact	 of	 students	 with	 users	 is	 completely	absent.	Even	the	actual	case	being	studied	is	presented	to	students	not	as	a	specific	person’s	problem,	but	as	a	mere	legal	problem	posed	by	the	clinic’s	coordinator,	who	is	often	a	lawyer.	After	all,	Frank	himself,	as	we	have	seen,	hoped	that	legal	clinics	would	allow	students	to	“see	legal	operations”,	so	the	‘doing’	was	reduced	to	an	object	of	contemplation.	This	totally	removes	from	the	framework	of	legal	teaching	the	idea	that	an	essential	part	of	the	 jurist’s	 experience	 is	 the	 relational	 and	 social	 dimension:	 empathy	 (or	 dislike)	 for	 the	person	posing	the	problem	and	the	sharing	of	(or	aversion	to)	the	interest	she	wants	to	claim.	But,	 above	 all,	 it	 removes	 the	 fundamental	 problem	of	 translating	what	 afflicts	 a	 person,	 to	follow	 Carnelutti	 in	 the	 extension	 of	 the	medical	metaphor,	 into	 a	 legal	 problem:	 as	 if	 this	were	an	operation	with	a	constrained	outcome	that	does	not	depend	on	the	operator.	Tacitly,	the	idea	that	it	is	a	scientific	operation,	the	subsumption	of	a	fact	under	a	rule	–	the	result	of	which	does	not	depend	on	who	has	the	problem	and	the	jurist	who	builds	it	as	a	legal	case	–	rather	than	a	creative,	relational,	claiming,	social	and	political	choice,	is	brought	into	‘learning	by	doing’.	In	other	words,	we	lose	what	Mark	Tushnet	(1984),	in	an	essay	dating	back	to	the	time	 when	 the	 clinical	 movement	 was	 yet	 to	 consolidate,	 presented	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	significant	 values	 of	 legal	 clinics:	 their	 giving	 students	 an	 opportunity	 to	 ‘create’	 a	 legal	experience	of	an	unstructured	situation,	not	yet	set	in	a	relationship	between	the	lawyer	and	the	client,	not	yet	defined	by	academic	disciplines,	or	not	yet	brought	back	to	case	law	records.	Having	to	deal	with	a	still	unstructured	legal	experience	teaches	students	that	the	law	has	to	do	with	people,	with	the	emotions	they	have	or	arouse,	even	before	cases	and	technicalities.	Today,	in	Italy,	this	experience	is	fully	guaranteed	by	clinics	such	as	the	“Clinic	of	Immigration	and	Citizenship	Law”	at	the	Department	of	Law	of	Roma	Tre	University	and	the	“Legal	Clinic	for	Human	Rights”	 (CLEDU)	at	Palermo	University.	 Indeed,	 these	 clinics	have	 set	up	a	desk,	within	 the	 universities,	 where	 foreigners	 go	 personally	 and	 are	 received	 by	 students	 who	listen	to	their	problems.	Thus,	 the	 clinics,	 conceived	as	 a	professionalizing	 tool,	 do	not	 innovate	but	 reinforce	 the	conception	of	the	jurist	as	a	professional	who	sells	his	technical	knowledge	to	the	best	buyer	on	the	market,	a	conception	very	far	from	that	of	a	social	actor	who	makes	choices	laden	with	political	significance.	So	understood,	the	clinical	approach	appears	to	be	perfectly	in	line	with	a	world	where	the	market	is	seen	as	a	unique	natural	paradigm	for	the	organization	of	social	relations,	where	universities	themselves	are	thought	of	as	businesses	and	the	legal	profession,	therefore,	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	way	 of	 being	 on	 a	market	 characterized	by	 the	development	 of	
                                                5	“Nascita	e	diffusione	delle	cliniche	legali”,	document	of	the	“Cesare	Beccaria”	Department	of	Legal	Sciences	of	Milan	University,	accessible	 from	the	page	on	“Legal	Clinics”	 (http://www.beccaria.unimi.it/ecm/home/legalclinics),	which	symptomatically	and	symbolically	 adopts	 the	 English	 name	 http://www.beccaria.unimi.it/extfiles/unimidire/385401/attachment/nascita-e-diffusione-delle-cliniche-legali-1.pdf.	
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what,	not	by	chance,	are	called	law	firms.	‘Learning	by	doing’	in	this	context	is	simply	a	way	of	supplementing	 the	 traditional	 teaching	of	 law,	based	on	 the	 identity	of	normative	 texts	 and	rules,	 with	 first	 directions	 on	 how	 to	 articulate	 the	 subsumption	 of	 practical	 cases	 in	 the	normative	framework.	Despite	references	to	the	legal-realist	tradition,	the	current	practice	of	the	clinical	approach	is	therefore	perfectly	in	line	with	the	classical	Enlightenment	conception	of	the	jurist	as	the	mouth	of	the	law.	Emphasis	 on	 the	 professionalizing	 aspect	 also	 minimizes	 the	 value	 of	 the	 social	 justice	proposals	 that	mark	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 legal	 clinics	 and	 their	 spread.	 Even	when	 they	 declare	their	will	 to	continue	the	 line	that	characterized	their	boom	in	the	United	States,	recovering	the	attention	for	the	rights	of	marginal	or	weak	subjects,	Italian	legal	clinics,	like	many	of	the	current	 ones	 in	 the	United	 States,	 seem	at	 best	 to	 remind	 the	 ‘market	 player’	 jurist	 that	 he	must	 also	 carry	 out	 a	 pro	 bono	 activity	 for	 noble	 causes.	 According	 to	 a	 Kantian	 and	Protestant	 approach,	we	move	 from	 the	 social	 to	 the	 individual	 level,	 from	access	 to	 justice	conceived	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 change	 power	 structures	 to	 calling	 the	 individual	 to	 ethical-moral	values,	 if	not	simply	to	reminding	the	professional	of	his	“deontological	duties”.	Attention	to	marginal	people	is	not	declined	as	a	‘right	building’	that	favours	their	empowerment,	but	as	a	reminder	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 success,	 measured	 in	 economic	 terms	 –	 to	 which,	 however,	 a	commitment	 to	 ‘a	 humanitarian	 case’,	 spent	 on	 social	 media,	 can	 contribute	 significantly	 –	may	not	be	enough	to	reassure,	as	Calvin	had	 it,	 the	 lawyer	about	his	 “eternal	salvation”.	 In	line	with	the	philanthropic	conception,	which	has	always	accompanied	the	development	of	the	market	in	English-speaking	countries,	the	clinical	approach	seems	to	have,	therefore,	above	all	the	distinction	of	legitimizing	the	professional	acting	on	the	market,	the	law	firm’s	associate,	allowing	him	 to	 think	 of	 himself	 as	 ‘good’,	 occasionally	 attentive	 to	 the	needs	 of	 those	who	cannot	afford	high	fees:	“How	are	you	feeling,	friend,	fragile	friend?	If	you	want	I	can	devote	an	hour	a	month	to	you”6	(De	André,	1975).		
From	“learning	by	doing”	to	“learning	by	making	(up)”7		The	 picture	 I	 have	 sketched	 depicts	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 clinical-legal	method	 in	 Italy	 as	 a	phenomenon	that	looks	back	instead	of	forward,	a	belated	attempt	to	catch	up	with	needs	that	were	emphasized	in	the	world	of	civil	 law	as	in	that	of	common	law	in	the	1930s.	Under	the	pressure	 of	 the	 urgent	 need	 to	 make	 room	 for	 learning	 the	 practice,	 today’s	 discovery	 of	teaching	methods	born	in	the	tradition	of	common	law	and	linked	to	 it,	simply	and	partially	values	 its	 centuries-long	 rejection	 of	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 a	 university	 teaching	 of	 law8,	 and	 its	
                                                6	The	verse	goes	on	like	this:	“You	know	I	lost	two	children”;	“Madam,	you	are	one	absent-minded	woman”.	7	 “We	can	easily	 imagine	people	amusing	themselves	 in	a	 field	by	playing	with	a	ball	so	as	 to	start	various	existing	games,	but	playing	many	without	finishing	them	and	in	between	throwing	the	ball	aimlessly	into	the	air,	chasing	one	another	with	the	ball	and	bombarding	one	 another	 for	 a	 joke	 and	 so	on.	And	now	someone	 says:	The	whole	 time	 they	 are	playing	 a	ball-game	and	following	definite	rules	at	every	throw.	And	is	there	not	also	the	case	where	we	play	and—make	up	the	rules	as	we	go	along?	And	there	is	even	one	where	we	alter	them—as	we	go	along”	(Wittgenstein	§	83,	the	expressions	in	italics	are	in	English	in	the	German	original	text).	8	 In	 the	world	of	Civil	 law,	 the	 first	course	 in	 law	was	born	 in	Bologna	 in	 the	year	(1088)	 twelve	years	 later	when,	winning	at	Hastings,	the	Normans	conquered	England.	In	the	common	law	world,	the	first	chair	of	common	law,	the	Vinerian	Professorship,	was	established	in	Oxford	in	1756,	thanks	to	Charles	Viner’s	bequest	that	allowed	Blackstone	to	be	the	first	English	professor	of	
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claim	 that	 law	 itself	 is	 a	 practice	 that	 can	only	be	 taught	 in	 the	 Inns	 of	 Court.	On	 the	 other	hand,	 the	 deep	 theoretical	 difference	 between	 viewing	 law	 as	 a	 tradition	 (first	 customary,	then	 judicial)	 and	 as	 a	 body	 of	 normative	 texts	 is	 ignored.	 This	 completely	 neglects	 the	difference	 between	 two	 ideas	 of	 law.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 law	 that	 builds	 up	 according	 to	 its	capacity,	proven	over	time,	to	satisfactorily	proceduralise	conflicts.	On	the	other	hand,	law	as	a	regulatory	device	containing	the	legislators’	plan	to	define	the	modes	of	social	coexistence,	a	device	that	is	effective	because	it	has	normative	force,	i.e.	it	is	expressed	through	a	system	of	commands	that	control	individuals’	behaviour	through	the	threat	pf	punishments.	This	situation	makes	me	suspicious	of	the	claims	(Bloch	and	Menon	2012,	p.	273)	that	the	“global	clinical	movement”	 is	 imposing	a	substantially	uniform	reform	of	academic	curricula	in	very	different	contexts,	reorienting	jurists’	training	towards	social	justice.	Rather,	I	see	the	clinical	method	as	a	sharp	blade:	it	can	be	used	to	save	a	human	life	by	removing	a	tumour,	or	to	kill	a	person.	Its	use	is	not	in	itself	a	revolution	in	legal	education.	As	the	experiences,	not	only	 Italian,	 show,	 it	 lends	 itself	 very	 well	 as	 an	 ancillary	 tool	 of	 the	 traditional	 way	 of	teaching,	strengthening	its	professionalizing	aspects.9	Only	if	the	clinical	approach	is	used	out	of	 the	 conviction	 that,	 even	 before	 the	 ways	 of	 teaching	 law,	 the	 conception	 of	 law	 being	taught	 must	 be	 profoundly	 revised,	 can	 its	 elements	 that	 are	 normally	 relegated	 to	 the	rhetorical	level	fully	develop.	Marella	and	Rigo	(2015,	p.	549-50),	 in	the	article	already	mentioned,	suggest	that	in	Italy	you	can	“play	tactically”	the	category	of	the	Third	Mission	to	give	an	appropriate	container	to	legal	clinics	and,	since	it	will	be	a	criterion	for	the	evaluation	of	universities,	strengthen	their	orientation	 to	 social	 justice.	 This	 intelligent	 suggestion	 stems	 from	 the	 vaguely	 social	colouring	 that	 the	 Italian	 National	 Agency	 for	 Research	 Evaluation	 (ANVUR)	 gives	 to	 this	container	of	functions	performed	by	the	University.	In	fact,	as	the	two	authors	point	out,	in	the	“language,	albeit	ambiguous,	of	ANVUR	(2013)	 this	mission	must	aim	at	 the	production	of	a	‘public	good’	aimed	at	increasing	‘the	welfare	of	society’.”	Marella	and	Rigo	rightly	underline	the	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 characterization	 of	 this	 container	 that	 includes	 all	 the	 activities	 with	which	universities	“interact	directly	with	society”	(as	if	through	teaching	you	came	into	contact	with	the	vegetable	kingdom).	Given	this	all-encompassing	nature	of	the	category,	bringing	the	clinical	approach	back	to	the	Third	Mission	does	not	help	to	unravel	the	knot	of	the	nature	of	legal	 clinics.	 This	 container	 accommodates	 both	 professional	 clinics	 aimed	 at	 producing	market-ready	professionals	and	those	aimed	at	enabling	lawyers	to	promote	the	rights	claims	of	marginal	individuals	excluded	from	the	market.	In	fact,	ANVUR	considers	as	a	key	aspect	of	the	Third	Mission,	alongside	the	“cultural	and	social”	activities	that	produce	“public	goods	that	
                                                                                                                                               law.	On	the	English	legal	world’s	hostility	to	the	university	teaching	of	 law,	which	goes	hand	in	hand	with	that	for	codification,	and	on	its	slow	overcoming,	I	refer	to	Santoro	2008,	chapter	2,	see	also	Braun	(2006).	The	spread	of	legal	clinics	in	the	English	legal	faculties	starting	from	Oxford	University	(Oxford	Legal	Assistance	Project)	and	the	Queen	Mary	University	of	London	(Legal	Advice	 Centre)	 is	 therefore	 interesting,	 symptomatic	 of	 both	 the	 evolution	 of	 law	 teaching	 in	 England,	 and	 of	 the	marketing/professionalizing	pressure.	9	According	 to	 the	 ‘enthusiasts’	 (Bloch	 and	Menon	2012,	 271)	 the	methodology	of	 legal	 clinics	 that	 is	 spreading	prepares	 law	students	“to	understand	and	assimilate	their	responsibilities	as	members	of	a	public	profession	in	the	administration	of	the	law,	in	the	reform	of	the	law,	in	the	equitable	distribution	of	legal	services	in	society,	in	the	protection	of	individual	rights	and	public	interests,	 and	 in	upholding	 the	basic	 elements	of	professionalism.”	More	 than	a	 reform	of	 academic	 curricula,	 this	description	seems	to	outline	their	integration	with	a	professionalizing	part	coloured	by	the	emphasis	of	the	ethical-deontological	duties.	
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increase	 the	 welfare	 of	 society”,	 the	 “economic	 valorisation	 of	 knowledge”.	 Indicators	 for	measuring	universities’	activity	 in	 this	 field	 include	obtained	patents	or	 spin-offs.	The	 latter	are	 companies	 that	 exploit	 the	 commercial	 potential	 of	 innovation	 produced	 by	 university	research	 that	 cannot	 find	 an	 adequate	 space	 on	 the	 market	 on	 its	 own:	 we	 could	 imagine	university	law	firms	as	activities	of	the	Third	Mission.	I	 hope	 that	 the	 clinical	 approach	will	 be	 a	 didactic	 tool	 used	not	 to	 combine	 a	 practical-professional	part	with	traditional	courses	based	on	normative	texts,	but	to	radically	revise	the	teaching	of	law.	This	tool	can	and	must	be	used	not	to	support,	but	to	oppose	the	professional	reduction	of	 university	 teaching,	which	 in	 the	 long	 run	will	 lead	 to	 the	 annihilation	of	 legal	knowledge.	Legal	clinics	are	an	opportunity	to	do	a	job	of	great	cultural	value,	even	more	than	professional,	a	job	which,	I	should	like	to	say,	is	the	work	of	universities.	In	other	words,	they	are	an	opportunity	 to	 reaffirm,	going	 in	 the	opposite	direction	 from	what	was	suggested	by	the	“Bologna	Process”,	that	one	thing	is	university	courses	and	another	is	those	of	the	Radio	Elettra	School.10	Legal	clinics	are	interesting,	 in	my	opinion,	 if	 they	allow	us	to	establish	this	distinction,	not	to	collapse	it.	If	 law	faculties	choose	to	reduce	legal	clinics	to	a	mere	professionalizing	tool,	they	miss	a	historic	opportunity	 to	rethink	 the	 teaching	of	 law,	abandoning	an	 ideological	conception	of	the	legal	phenomenon	that	its	scholars	have	known,	for	at	least	half	a	century,	to	be	outdated.	The	clinical	method,	 if	not	used	 in	an	ancillary	way	with	respect	 to	 traditional	 teaching,	can	instead	 be	 the	 pivot	 of	 legal	 degree	 courses	 capable	 of	 shaping	 critical	 autonomy	 and	therefore	of	producing	innovative	and	non-conformist	students.	The	 task	of	 legal	 clinic-based	education	should	be	 to	 teach	prospective	 jurists	 to	address	the	 problems	 individuals	 face	 and	 the	 conflicts	 they	 experience,	 enabling	 them	 to	 provide	their	clients	with	the	tools	to	proceduralise	and	overcome	them.	The	legal	clinical	method	is	an	opportunity,	 in	other	words,	 to	develop	a	 teaching	 capable	of	making	 the	 student	 aware	that	 his	 task	 is	 not	 to	 be	 a	 cog	 in	 a	massive	 regulatory	mechanism,	 to	 subsume	 a	 fact	 or	 a	conduct	 under	 a	 rule.	 It	 appears	 as	 the	 tool	 to	 teach	 jurists	 that	 their	 task	 is	 to	 develop	different	effective	methods	of	 jurifying	personal	problems,	of	proceduralising	 individual	and	collective	conflicts.	The	clinical	method	allows	the	teaching	of	a	law	conceived	not	as	a	more	or	less	ordered	system	of	normative	texts,	but	as	a	knowledge	that,	using	those	texts	and	their	readings,	 is	built	 from	below,	 from	 the	problem	and	 the	proposed	 conflict,	 and	develops	by	building	 together	 the	 legal	 problem	 (the	 “case”)	 and	 its	 regulating	 rule.	 It	 is	 thanks	 to	 this	feature	that	it	can	serve	social	justice	by	teaching	students	to	care	about	how	to	‘build’	access	to	justice	for	those	who	have	never	even	thought	that	their	problem	had	legal	dignity.	If,	 instead	 of	 looking	 at	 the	 needs	 emphasised	 by	 Carnelutti	 in	 1935	 and	 neglected	 for	about	eighty	years,	we	looked	at	the	epistemological	reflections	that	have	developed	since	the	mid-1960s	and	have	always	been	 ignored	by	 legal	science	and	 law	courses,	 then	the	clinical	
                                                10	 The	 “About	 us”	 page	 of	 the	 School’s	 website	 (http://www.scuolaradioelettra.it/)	 reads:	 “SCUOLA	 RADIO	 ELETTRA.	Professional	 training	 since	1951.	An	 accredited	 centre	 for	 professional	 training,	 Scuola	Radio	Elettra	 provides	 theoretical	 and	practical	 courses	 strongly	 oriented	 towards	 the	world	 of	work.	 The	 training	 offer,	 originally	 specialised	 in	 plant	 engineering,	electronics	and	 information	 technology,	 is	now	extended	 to	 the	areas	of	 food,	beauty	and	wellness,	health	and	social	 services.	Active	since	1951,	Scuola	Radio	Elettra	has	trained	more	than	1	million	people.”	
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method	 could	 serve	 to	 radically	 change	 our	 teachings.	 Legal	 clinics	 could	 be	 the	 pivot	 of	degree	courses	premised	on	the	assumption	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	“legal	science”.	But	the	 basis	 of	 this	 assumption	 would	 not	 be	 the	 old	 discussion	 between	 the	 deductive	nomological	 model	 and	 the	 interpretive	 model,	 between	 the	 scientific	 method	 and	 the	historical	method.	Rather,	as	we	learned	from	the	“linguistic	turn”	and	from	Kuhn’s	use	of	it	in	his	masterly	book	on	The	 structure	of	 scientific	 revolutions,	 it	would	be	 the	notion	 that	even	‘sciences’	 are	 but	 discourses.	 Legal	 clinics	 could	 be	 an	 opportunity	 to	 recognize	 that	 for	 a	century	 the	 idea	of	 legal	 syllogism	was	 the	pivot	of	an	 ideological	operation	 that	 structured	the	organization	of	power	in	liberal-democratic	societies	and	formed	jurists’	mentality,	their	
Denkstil	(Fleck,	1935).	If	 we	 took	 the	 legal-realist	 matrix	 of	 the	 clinical	 method	 seriously,	 we	 could	 use	 it	 not	(only)	 to	 develop	 a	 teaching	 that	 takes	 the	 features	 of	 contemporary	 law	 and	 its	transformations	into	account.	Clinics	provide	an	opportunity	to	teach	law	as	something	that	is	created	 daily	 by	 a	 community	 of	 jurists	 who	 work	 in	 the	 hiatus	 existing	 between	 the	normative	text,	produced	by	legislators,	and	the	norm,	built	by	the	community	itself	through	dialogue,	 cross-critical	 scrutiny	 and	 review	 through	 different	 court	 levels.	 They	 provide	 an	opportunity	to	bring	to	the	fore	this	awareness,	that	the	Enlightenment	ideology	(normativist,	formalist,	 imperativist,	etc.)	 relegated	 for	decades	 to	 legal	 theorists’	discourses,	cultural	and	non-professionalizing,	 or	 to	 practitioners’	 background	 awareness,	 which	 does	 not	 interfere	with	their	activities	(“I	know	of	Einstein’s	theory	of	relativity,	but	to	do	things	in	everyday	–	professional	–	life	the	Newton	system	is	fine”).	Legal	clinics	must	be	the	tool	to	teach	students	not	 a	 professionalizing	 ‘doing’,	 how	 to	 use	 legal	 science	 in	 practice,	 how	 to	 perform	subsumption,	but	a	‘making’	that	is,	first	and	foremost,	a	cultural	break.	In	 order	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 operation	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 turn	 to	American	 realism,	 just	look	at	the	Italian	one	and	in	particular	at	Giovanni	Tarello’s	work.	The	Genoese	legal	theorist	was	 in	 fact,	 in	 Italy,	 the	 most	 determined	 and	 shrewd	 critic	 of	 the	 theory	 that	 legal	interpretation	 is	 knowledge	 of	 pre-existing	 norms	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 scientific	 enterprise	(hence	the	idea	of	“legal	sciences”,	which	stands	out	in	the	name	of	a	plethora	of	Italian	legal	departments)	and	not,	 instead,	production	of	norms	(and,	therefore,	a	political	enterprise).11	When	no	one	thought	(any	more)	of	legal	clinics,	Tarello	(1976-77,	p.	936)	reminded	us	that,	in	 legal	 practice,	 “different	 operators,	 at	 different	 times	 or	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 for	 different	purposes	or	pursuing	the	same	purposes	with	different	means,	identify	different	and	perhaps	conflicting	norms	in	the	same	legislative	texts.”12	Clinics	 are	 the	 tool	 to	 finally	 develop	 a	 teaching	 based	 on	 the	 consideration	 that	 the	normative	 statements,	 contained	 in	 the	 legal	 sources,	 are	never	 open	 to	 one	 interpretation,	but	 rather	 to	 a	 plurality	 of	 interpretations,	 none	 of	 which	 is	 for	 that	 very	 reason	 ‘true’.	
                                                11	Tarello’s	argumentative	path	began	with	“Il	 ‘problema	dell’interpretazione’:	una	formulazione	ambigua”	of	1966	followed	by	the	 long	essay	“Studi	sulla	 teoria	generale	dei	precetti.	 I.	 Introduzione	al	 linguaggio	precettivo”	of	1968	(now	both	collected	 in	Tarello,	1974)	and	was	fully	accomplished	in	the	work	L’interpretazione	delle	leggi	of	1980.	His	historiographic	work	too	(Storia	
della	cultura	giuridica	moderna.	I.	Assolutismo	e	codificazione	del	diritto	of	1976)	was	devoted	to	reconstructing	how,	in	modern	times,	jurists’	role	was	technicalised	and	depoliticised.	12	On	Tarello’s	 teaching	see	 the	 first	chapter	of	Guastini,	2017.	On	the	distinction	between	normative	 text	and	norm,	see	again	Guastini,	2011.	Among	 the	non-Italian	authors	who	have	clearly	argued	 the	same	view	Troper,	1994,	 is	worth	mentioning.	On	Troper’s	work,	too,	one	can	see	Guastini’s	aforementioned	volume,	in	particular,	chapter	V.	
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Whether	 an	 interpretation	 is	 admissible	 or	 not,	 what	 are	 the	 norms	 for	 which	 there	 are	“assertability	 conditions”,	 is	 decided,	 in	 different	 historical	 moments,	 by	 the	 community	 of	interpreters	 (cf.	 Santoro,	 2008,	 p.	 281-334),	 that	 is,	 the	 jurists	 or,	 as	Tarello	 (1967,	 p.	 205)	says,	the	“internal	legal	culture”.	In	this	‘realist’	conception	of	law,	every	article	of	law,	every	paragraph,	is	not	a	norm,	but	a	battlefield	in	which	various	actors	clash	to	define	the	‘norm’	to	be	 derived	 from	 it.	 However,	 this	 clash	 takes	 place	 using	 a	 precise	 language,	 if	 you	 like	‘technical’,	and	its	reference	texts	are	a	set,	not	only	chronologically	open	(as	we	know	today,	thanks	to	the	crisis	of	the	system	of	sources),	but	constantly	changing.	Insofar	as	the	existing	law	is	made	up	of	norms,	the	law	student	cannot	help	but	study	the	“legal	 building”	 (see	 Guastini,	 2011,	 p.	 105-228	 and	 2017,	 p.	 20	 and	 80),	 that	 is,	 how	 the	meaning	 of	 a	 normative	 text,	 the	 techniques	 used	 to	 argue	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 norm	 derived	from	it,	are	produced.	Clinics	seem	to	be	a	particularly	suitable	didactic	tool	to	explain	that	in	the	 construction	 work	 jurists	 always	 shift	 between	 a	 descriptive	 and	 a	persuasive/prescriptive	level.	The	first	level	is	that	of	the	“theory	of	interpretation”	(Guastini,	2011,	p.	407-32),	that	is,	the	recognition	level	of	how,	in	judicial	and	administrative	practice,	legal	operators	have	read	and	used	normative	documents	until	then.	The	second	level	is	that	of	 the	 “ideology	 of	 interpretation”	 (Guastini,	 p.	 433),	 that	 is,	 of	 a	 persuasive	 discourse:	 a	discourse	which	aims	to	create	the	assertability	conditions	for	interpreting	a	normative	text,	while	advocating	that	interpretation.		
Direct	contact	with	people	and	access	to	justice		Thus	understood,	legal	clinics	are	a	tool	that	allows	students	to	understand	that,	as	jurists,	their	job	will	be	to	devote	themselves	to	the	judicial	and	doctrinal	creation	of	rules.	First	of	all,	they	must	be	aware	that	they	are	not	and	will	not	be	the	wheels	of	a	gear	moved	by	a	larger	wheel,	 the	 legislator,	 but	 that,	 whenever	 they	 exercise	 their	 profession,	 they	 will	 make	intrinsically	 and	 inevitably	 political	 choices.	 Clinical	 teaching	 is,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	instrument	 to	make	 jurists	 immediately	understand	 that,	 regardless	of	 the	criterion	guiding	their	work,	 they	will	make	a	 ‘political’	choice,	 that	 is,	relative	to	the	use	of	 legitimate	power	(Santoro,	2017,	161-167)	and,	at	the	same	time,	to	make	them	aware	that	only	if	this	political	decision	–	the	creation	of	the	norm	–	is	made	explicit,	will	it	be	subject	to	critical	scrutiny	by	the	community	of	interpreters.	After	 developing	 this	 awareness,	 prospective	 jurists	 can	 start	 thinking	 about	whether	 to	direct	their	choices	based	on	their	practical	results,	on	their	 impact	on	people’s	 lives,	rather	than	on	the	observance	of	elegant	dogmatic	constructions	or	on	the	more	established	opinion	(criteria	often	assumed	as	indices	of	‘truth’	validating	the	exegetic	operation),	or	on	criteria	of	productivity,	decisions	speed,	which	seem	to	be	required,	not	only	by	the	market	of	the	legal	professions,	but	also	by	the	organizational	ways	of	the	judicial	profession	already	fashionable	or	threatened	by	proposed	reforms.	Only	by	being	aware	of	the	intrinsically	political	character	of	their	work	will	they	be	able	to	choose,	if	they	so	wish,	to	direct	their	action	towards	social	justice,	 towards	the	building	of	a	 law	that	enables	weak	people	to	have	access	to	 justice.	On	
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the	 other	 hand,	 they	 can	 also	 make	 the	 opposite	 choice,	 and	 direct	 their	 action,	 as	professionals,	to	the	maximization	of	individual	profit	(as,	according	to	what	Tarello	reported,	Carnelutti	did),	as	judges,	to	the	speed	of	their	career.	Legal	clinics	are	faced	with	the	same	type	of	choice:	they	can	be	structured	with	the	aim	of	stimulating	 students’	 imagination	 on	 how	 to	 defend	 the	 weak	 and	marginalized,	 or	 rather,	using	a	broader	expression	 that	better	 conveys	 the	 idea	of	 the	enterprise,	on	how	 to	 create	their	 rights.	But	 they	can	also	be	simply	professionalizing,	giving	 law	students	 the	ability	 to	build	 the	 law	that	 is	most	 in	demand	and	best	paid	by	the	market,	 they	can	 initiate	 them	to	build	a	law	firm	as	a	spin-off	of	their	activity.	A	 legal	 clinic	 can	make	 this	 choice	primarily	 through	 its	own	 thematic	 area.	Attention	 to	social	 justice	 also,	 or	 perhaps	 above	 all,	 shows	 up	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 legal	 clinics	 have	mostly	developed	 in	 areas	 that	more	 often	 and	more	 problematically	 involve	weak	 people	 (family	law,	 labour	 law,	 immigration	 law,	 criminal	 law,	 criminal	 enforcement	 law)	 or	 collective	interests	(environmental	law	and	consumer	rights).	In	the	last	academic	year,	47%	of	the	US	Law	Schools	had	a	legal	clinic	in	the	field	of	criminal	defence;	17%	had	a	clinic	in	the	field	of	criminal	prosecution	(therefore	focused	on	the	defence	of	victims);	9%	had	a	clinic	in	the	field	of	prisoners’	 rights.	Thus,	a	significant	part	of	 the	US	 legal	clinics	deals	with	both	offenders,	during	 the	 trial	 and	 then	 in	 the	 execution	 phase	 of	 the	 sentence	 –	 i.e.	 individuals	 whose	fundamental	 rights	 claims	 appear	 to	 be	 undermined	 by	 their	 behaviour	 –	 and	 victims	 (e.g.	women	 and	 children),	 seeking	 support	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 rights.	 Significantly,	 the	focus	on	the	weak	does	not	make	these	two	paths	appear	contradictory,	as	is	the	case	in	the	common	discourse	(which	contrasts	perpetrators’	and	victims’	rights),	but	as	part	of	the	same	approach.	But	delimiting	the	ambit	in	itself	is	not	enough	to	characterize	the	orientation	of	a	clinic,	as	in	every	ambit	a	radical,	progressive	or	conservative	approach	can	be	taken.	In	my	opinion,	the	legal	clinics	that	aim	to	address	the	weak	and	marginalised	must	learn	to	 combine	 Mauro	 Cappelletti’s	 views	 on	 access	 to	 justice	 with	 those	 of	 the	 American	sociologist	 Charles	Wright	Mills	 on	 the	 “sociological	 imagination”.	 For	 Cappelletti,	 access	 to	justice	is	not	only	an	individual	right	to	be	universalised,	but	an	indicator	whose	development	measures	“a	ceaseless	social	progress,	which	implies	a	constant	debate	both	on	the	modes	of	access	 and	 on	 the	 resulting	 idea	 of	 justice”	 (Cappelletti-Garth	 1981,	 I	 owe	 the	 quotation	 to	Marella-Rigo	 2015,	 539-40).	 For	 his	 part,	 Mills	 (1959)	 urged	 sociologists	 interested	 in	defending	marginal	people	to	develop	a	“sociological	imagination”,	that	is,	a	language	capable	of	putting	women	and	men	 in	a	position	 to	 transform	 their	 “personal	 troubles”	 into	 “public	issues”.	 Similarly,	 the	 legal	 clinics	 that	 intend	 to	be	 attentive	 to	marginal	 people’s	 access	 to	justice	 must	 develop,	 to	 recall	 the	 title	 of	 an	 essay	 by	 Pietro	 Costa,	 “legal	 imagination”:	 a	discourse	 capable	 of	 transforming	 the	 “private	 troubles”	 of	 marginal	 people	 into	 legal	problems,	 into	 claims	 to	 be	 brought	 before	 a	 judge.	 Costa	 writes	 (1995,	 p.	 33-34),	 at	 the	conclusion	of	his	essay	(which	every	jurist	should	read	and	meditate	on):		 Judges	 act	 as	 institutional	 resolvers	 of	 conflicts	 in	 the	 light	 of	 an	 order	(apparently)	already	given	and	motionless,	which	however	unfolds	its	project	potential	 at	 the	 very	 time	 when	 judges	 reformulate	 it	 as	 a	 function	 of	 an	
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intersubjective	 dynamic	 that	 is	 always	 new	 and	 different.	 Legal	 imagination	unfolds	in	a	story	suspended	programmatically	between	a	depicted	order	that	exists	 only	 as	 ‘described’	 (in	 the	 jurist’s	 possible	 world)	 and	 a	 developing	project	 that	 exists	 only	 as	 implemented	 (in	 the	 context	 of	 daily	 social	interaction).		Legal	imagination	is	a	fundamental	tool	for	shifting	from	a	“described”	order,	which	tends	to	classify	marginality	 conditions	 as	 ‘private	 troubles’,	 to	 a	 project,	which	will	 exist	 only	 as	 it	 is	built	by	jurists,	in	which	they	rise	to	that	particular	configuration	of	a	public	issue	that	is	a	‘court	case’.	‘Troubles’,	 in	 Mills’	 vocabulary,	 are	 personal	 issues,	 whose	 definition	 and	 resolution	 are	considered	by	the	 individual	as	an	operation	to	be	carried	out	 in	his	 immediate	environment,	that	is,	in	the	social	framework	that	is	directly	open	to	his	personal	experience,	in	the	context	of	his	immediate	relations	with	his	neighbours,	and,	within	limits,	through	his	voluntary	activity.	‘Issues’	 instead	 are	 problems	 that	 transcend	 an	 individual’s	 particular	 environment	 and	 the	boundaries	of	his	inner	life.	‘Issues’	are	the	responsibility	of	the	institutions	of	a	historic	society;	they	arise	from	the	overlapping	and	interweaving	of	power	relationships	and	social	structures	that	provide	 the	 framework	within	which	 individual	 lives	 are	 articulated.	The	 resolution	of	 a	problem	 seems	 impossible	 without	 an	 institutional	 intervention	 that	 modifies	 supposedly	structural	 conditions.	 The	 work	 of	 transformation	 that	 jurists	 have	 to	 do	 is	 different,	 more	technical	 than	 what	 Mills	 asked	 sociologists:	 jurists	 have	 to	 transform	 private	 troubles	 into	claims	that	can	be	brought	before	a	judge.	People	do	not	usually	see	their	‘troubles’	in	terms	of	historical	changes,	they	do	not	consider	them	 ‘public	 issues’,	 they	 are	 driven	 by	 the	 style	 of	 thinking	 around	 them	 to	 attribute	 the	welfare	they	enjoy	or	the	misery	they	suffer	to	their	own	responsibility	and	to	take	charge	of	the	blame,	 or	 to	 boast	 of	 the	 merit,	 for	 their	 own	 conditions.	 Mills	 described	 sociological	imagination	 as	 the	 language	 that	 allows	 individuals	 to	 trace,	 in	 the	 chaos	 of	 everyday	experience,	 the	 broad	 lines	 that	make	up	 the	 fabric	 of	modern	 society,	 and	 to	 ‘see’	 how	 they	condition	their	affairs.	Even	less	normally	do	marginalised	people	have	the	tools	to	identify	the	solution	 to	 their	 ‘personal	 troubles’	 in	 claiming	 rights	 to	 be	 respected.	 In	 order	 to	 transform	private	troubles	into	legal	problems,	the	operation	of	law	must	see	the	intertwining	of	powers	(economic,	 social,	physical,	 etc.)	 that	 lies	behind	 those	 troubles,	 and	understand	 if	 and	how	a	power	 can	be	 activated	 autonomous	 from	 the	 social	 stratification	of	 power:	 the	 legal	 one.	As	Weber	 taught	 us,	 in	 fact,	 legal	 power	 often	 serves	 to	 compensate	 the	 other	 social	 powers,	bridging	the	‘power’	gap	that	afflicts	marginal	people.	The	 terms	 ‘see’	 and	 ‘language’	 are	 closely	 related	 and	 decisive	 for	 transforming	 ‘private	troubles’	into	claims	that	can	be	brought	before	a	judge.	It	is	language	that	allows	us	to	describe	and	catalogue	the	situations	we	live	in,	imagining	the	strategies	to	deal	with	them.13	
                                                13	George	Orwell	 in	1984,	with	 the	metaphor	of	 the	“newspeak”,	 to	which	 the	appendix	of	 the	work	entitled	“The	Principles	of	Newspeak”	 is	dedicated,	effectively	underlined	 the	ability	of	 language	 to	define	 the	world	and	 therefore	people’s	possibility	of	action.	Orwell	shows	how,	if	a	totalitarian	power	engages	in	the	creation	of	a	“newspeak”,	it	does	not	(only)	do	so	to	provide	an	expressive	means	that	replaces	the	old	worldview	and	the	old	mental	habits,	but	also	to	try	and	make	any	other	form	of	thought	
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Consider	the	following	example,	concerning	issues	that	are	much	debated	today.	To	be	born	in	northern	Mali,	scourged	by	wars	and	massacres,	is	a	“personal	trouble”.	To	make	a	convincing	case,	 possibly	 underlining	 the	 post-colonial	 responsibilities	 of	 Western	 states,	 at	 the	institutional	 level	and	in	the	political	debate,	of	how	the	 international	community	can	take	on	the	task	of	guaranteeing	the	 lives	of	people	born	in	Mali	and	saving	them	from	the	massacres	being	 carried	out	 there,	 transforming	 that	 “personal	 trouble”	 into	 a	 “public	 issue”,	 is	 the	 task	that	Mills	entrusted	to	the	sociological	imagination.	To	guarantee	to	those	born	in	northern	Mali,	without	 risking	 their	 lives	 in	 the	 crossing	 of	 Libya	 and	 the	 Mediterranean,	 a	 (possibly	successful)	 access	 to	 the	 asylum	 procedure,	 is	 the	 task	 of	 the	 legal	 imagination:	 a	 jurist	undertakes	this	task	by	elaborating	an	imaginary	order,	where	all	people’s	fundamental	rights	are	guaranteed,	and	presenting	it	to	a	judge	for	her	to	make	it	actual.	Through	 what	 sociologists	 call	 a	 “process	 of	 objectification”,	 language	 gives	 situations	identity	and	meaning,	making	them	“objective”.	They	are	learned	and	internalized	by	users	of	a	language	with	 the	 connotation	 and	meaning	 conferred	 on	 them	by	 that	 language.	Among	 the	things	“objectified”	by	language	there	are	also	individuals’	actions	that	are	automatically	traced	back	to	orientations,	ends	and	means	through	which	other	group	members	give	them	meaning.	Through	the	process	of	objectification	some	types	of	action,	constantly	followed,	come	to	appear	as	 appropriate	 conduct	 to	 keep	 in	 certain	 circumstances.	 The	 process	 of	 transforming	appropriate	types	of	conduct	into	rules	is	favoured	by	the	fact	that	incentives	and	disincentives	are	 often	 distributed,	 and	 resources	 are	 imperatively	 allocated,	 according	 to	 the	 conduct’s	appropriateness.	Law	is	certainly	a	powerful	means,	even	symbolically,	to	establish	a	conduct’s	appropriateness	or	unacceptability.	Thus,	legal	language	plays	a	key	role	in	objectifying	a	given	behaviour,	in	giving	it	its	connotation	as	perceived	within	society.	Once	internalized,	an	action’s	connotation	 becomes	 common	 sense,	 that	 is,	 it	 becomes	part	 of	 the	 definitions	 shared	 in	 the	reality	of	everyday	life.	When	 Mills	 thought	 of	 sociological	 imagination	 as	 a	 language	 capable	 of	 transforming	“private	troubles”	into	“public	issues”,	he	thought	of	a	new	language	capable	of	influencing	the	mechanisms	of	objectifying	situations	and	the	types	of	conduct	appropriate	to	deal	with	them,	and	therefore	the	mechanisms	of	rules	 internalisation	and	formation.	His	 idea	 is	based	on	the	fact	that	the	process	of	objectification	of	 language	is	biunivocal:	past	objectification	structures	language,	 and	 therefore	 the	 world,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 use	 of	 language	 that	 allows	 the	 world	 to	 be	structured.	So	when	a	language	changes	the	way	things	are	seen,	makes	them	no	longer	be	seen	as	 private	 troubles	 but	 as	 public	 issues,	 it	 changes	 how	 the	 world	 is	 structured	 and,	consequently,	how	the	speakers	will	internalize	the	world	itself.	Legal	discourse	and	the	judicial	decisions	that	mark	it	certainly	play	an	important	role	in	the	process	of	objectifying	 reality.	The	 legal	 system,	 in	other	words,	 in	our	 societies	 is	not	only	a	practical	instrument	of	regulation,	but	also,	and	above	all,	a	way	to	strengthen	a	binding	system	of	 beliefs	 and	 to	 give	 meaning	 to	 everyday	 life.	 The	 “jurist’s	 imagination”	 is	 therefore	 a	fundamental	 tool	 to	 trigger	 the	 (cultural)	 process,	 to	 transform	 public	 indifference	 to	
                                                                                                                                               impossible.	Once	newspeak	has	been	rooted	in	the	population	and	the	“oldspeak”	has	been	completely	 forgotten,	any	heretical	thought	(i.e.	contrary	to	the	party’s	principles)	becomes	literally	impossible.	
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individuals’	personal	distress	into	a	concern	for	their	conditions	of	weakness	and	disadvantage,	to	transform	these	conditions	from	“personal	troubles”	to,	if	not	public	issues,	at	least	situations	worthy	of	legal	protection.	Jurists’	 discourse	 has	 a	 fundamental	 importance	 on	 how	 the	 conditions	 of	 weakness	 are	objectified	and	internalized,	and	become	part	of	common	sense.	Only	if	their	use	of	normative	texts	 is	 based	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 offering	 forms	 of	 legal	 protection	 (rights)	 and	proceduralisation	 of	 conflicts	 can	 interpreters	 help	 to	 restore	 a	 dignified	 life	 to	marginalised	persons.	 To	 achieve	 this	 goal,	 jurists	 must	 learn	 to	 use	 their	 “imagination”	 to	 develop	 a	jurisprudential	 discourse	 aimed	 at	 compensating,	 rather	 than	 accentuating,	 the	 conditions	 of	isolation	and	exclusion	in	which	the	“weaker”	normally	live.	The	task	of	a	clinic	oriented	to	the	protection	of	these	people	is	to	stimulate	the	“jurist’s	imagination”	(to	put	it	in	Costa’s	words),	his	ability	to	“invent”	(to	use	instead	Paolo	Grossi’s	language14),	by	finding	or	creating	it,	a	law	that	allows	the	many	people	who	live	on	the	margins	of	rights,	without	being	able	to	use	them,	to	access	the	remedies	provided	by	the	law.		
A	little	didactic	experiment:	the	legal	clinics	of	Florence	University		The	 Law	 School	 of	 Florence	 University	 accepted	 the	 proposal	 of	 “L’altro	 diritto”,	 inter-university	research	centre	on	prison,	deviance,	marginalisation	and	migration	governance,	to	activate,	 as	 part	 of	 its	 courses,	 three	 legal	 clinics	 that	 try	 to	 experiment	 with	 the	 realist	approach	that	has	been	illustrated	in	these	pages.	This	operation	is	made	possible	by	the	cultural	environment	that	characterises	the	School’s	teaching.	On	the	one	hand,	students	attend	courses	in	legal	history	based	on	the	teachings	of	the	 ‘Florentine	 school’	whose	 protagonists	 and	 great	masters	were	 Paolo	Grossi	 and	 Pietro	Costa.	On	 the	other	hand,	 through	 the	courses	 in	 legal	philosophy	which	 from	the	 first	year	introduce	 them	 to	 legal	 realism,	 ‘forcing’	 them	 to	 study	 On	 Law	 and	 Justice	 by	 Alf	 Ross,	students	also	become	familiar	with	the	idea	that	this	approach	can	be	an	interesting	point	of	view	to	orient	themselves	in	post-modern	law.	They	are	suggested	that	realism,	especially	in	Ross’s	‘cultural’	version,	is	a	theory	allowing	orientation	in	a	legal	world	characterised	by	the	crisis	 of	 the	hierarchy	of	 sources	 and	perhaps	of	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 legal	 source.	 For	Ross	taught	us	that	it	is	the	interpreters’	community	that	‘invents’	the	sources	of	law	and	not	these	that	 ‘create’	 law.	 This	 ‘cultural’	 line	 is	 also	 developed	 through	 the	 course	 of	 legal	argumentation,	 all	 focused	 on	 Tarello’s	 distinction	 between	 normative	 text	 and	 norm,	 and	aimed	at	disseminating	the	case-law	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights.	This	Court,	 for	many	years	now,	claims	in	fact	that	its	role	is	not	to	‘apply’	the	law,	in	its	case	the	Convention,	but	to	make	it	a	living	instrument	capable	of	protecting	fundamental	rights	while	keeping	up-to-date	and	progressively	increasing	the	level	of	protection,	moving	through	the	legal	cultures	and	normative	texts	of	forty-seven	countries.	The	course	of	legal	sociology,	too,	focused	on	the	
                                                14	The	latest	book	by	Paolo	Grossi	(2018)	is	entitled,	not	by	chance,	‘The	invention	of	law”.	The	title	plays,	in	a	fairly	uncovered	way,	on	the	modern	meaning	of	invention,	as	a	creation	ex	nihilo,	and	the	ancient	Latin	meaning	of	the	same	term	(inventio),	that	is	“discovery”	or	“finding”	of	something	that	already	evidently	exists,	but	also	“stratagem”.	
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sociology	of	punishment	and	deviance	(in	this	order,	due	to	a	precise	cultural	option	for	the	labelling	theory	approach),	pays	great	attention	to	how	the	Court	‘constructs’	prisoners’	rights	in	particular.	In	this	context,	the	Inter-University	Centre	and	the	School	of	Law	have	launched	three	legal	clinics	 aimed	 at	 stimulating	 students’	 imagination	 so	 that	 they	 can	 ‘construct’	 ways	 of	transforming	 into	 rights	 the	private	 troubles	 of	 sentenced	persons	 and	 those	who	 arrive	 in	Italy	asking	for	international	protection,	and	so	that	they	can	learn	the	language	of	the	ECtHR	and	begin	to	practice	the	Court’s	use	of	legal	imagination.	The	three	legal	clinics	have	a	stated	purpose	of	protecting	the	weaker	people’s	rights	since	their	very	names:	 they	are	not	 legal	 clinics	on	sentence	execution,	asylum	or	ECtHR,	but	on	“The	 rights	 of	 applicants	 for	 international	 protection”,	 “The	 protection	 of	 the	 sentenced	persons’	 rights”	 and	 “The	 protection	 of	 rights	 by	 the	 ECtHR”.	 Thus,	 they	 are	 clinics	 openly	devoted	to	the	‘construction’	of	marginal	people’s	rights.	Clinics	on	the	rights	of	applicants	for	international	protection	and	of	sentenced	persons	are	not	operated,	as	is	in	the	established	clinical	tradition,	with	lawyers.	First,	through	seminars,	students	 become	 familiar	 with	 the	 specialised	 legal	 discourses.	 Then,	 they	 go	 to	 work	alongside	the	judges	of	the	specialised	Section	for	Immigration	or	the	Supervisory	Court	and,	for	 the	 clinic	 on	 asylum	 seekers’	 rights,	 the	 operators	 of	 reception	 centres,	 preparing	applicants	 for	 the	 interview	 with	 the	 Asylum	 Commission.	 Students	 also	 work	 with	 the	volunteers	 of	 the	 Altro	 diritto	 NGO,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 Department	 of	Prison	Administration.	Within	several	Italian	prisons,	Altro	diritto	has	activated	a	number	of	counters	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 prisoners’	 rights,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 supporting	 the	 latter	 in	drafting	complaints	to	the	Supervisory	Judges	and	other	competent	authorities.	This	choice	has	been	made,	on	the	one	hand,	to	ensure	that	students	always	start	from	the	experience	 of	 people	 stating	 their	 “personal	 trouble”	 and	 giving	 their	 own	 account	 of	 this	“trouble”,	and	do	not	have	intermediaries	who	transform	in	advance	the	“personal	trouble”	in	a	 legal	 case.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 so	 that	 students	 can	 always	 compare	 the	 initial	 “personal	trouble”	with	the	decision	that	gives	 it	a	 legal	connotation	and	how	it	 is	made,	and	critically	evaluate	the	judge’s	political	choice.	We	have	chosen	to	support	the	magistrates	because	the	Specialized	Section	for	Immigration	of	the	Florence	Court	rightly	considers	it	its	duty	to	listen	to	 applicants	 for	 international	 protection.	 Students	 then	 listen	 to	 the	 story,	 the	 personal	trouble.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 their	 experience,	 as	 Frank	 says,	 they	 ‘see’	 how	 the	 judge	transforms	that	story	into	a	legal	case,	and	at	the	end	of	it	they	discuss	with	the	judge	himself	this	operation	and	its	political	assumptions	and	its	consequences	on	applicants’	 lives.	At	the	Supervisory	Court,	students	also	have	the	opportunity	to	understand,	through	the	files	of	the	sentenced	 persons,	 how	 the	 experience,	 the	 personal	 trouble,	 comes,	 step	 by	 step,	bureaucratised,	transformed	into	a	legal-administrative	fact	and	how	this	construction	affects	the	effectiveness	of	people’s	rights.	The	 only	 legal	 clinic	 that	 does	 not	 provide	 for	 direct	 contact	 with	 people	 and	 their	“troubles”	or	the	support	of	‘judges	at	work’	is	the	one	on	the	protection	of	rights	before	the	
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ECtHR,	and	this,	in	large	part,	for	obvious	logistical	difficulties.15	We	have	decided	to	start	this	clinic,	 these	 difficulties	 notwithstanding,	 because,	 as	 mentioned,	 conventional	 law	 is,	 by	explicit	 and	 repeated	 claim	of	 the	Court	 itself,	 a	 law	 that	 rejects	 the	 traditional	 relationship	with	the	text.	The	Court	explicitly	states	that	it	does	not	think	of	itself	and	does	not	want	to	be	the	“mouth	of	the	law”,	but	that	it	wants	to	be	the	“creator”	of	the	text’s	meaning	according	to	the	 consensus	 on	 the	 minimum	 level	 of	 protection	 prevailing	 in	 the	 Greater	 Europe,	 the	Europe	 composed	 of	 the	 forty-seven	Member	 States	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe.	 Such	 a	 claim	makes	it	unique	on	the	European	scene.	In	a	legal-realist	framework,	which	aims	to	present	the	jurist’s	work	as	a	‘construction’,	in	dialogue	 with	 the	 other	 jurists,	 starting	 from	 the	 rule’s	 normative	 text	 to	 protect	 certain	interests,	 it	 has	 finally	 appeared	 of	 great	 cultural	 importance	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 work	 of	 the	ECtHR	 as	 the	 most	 illustrious	 example	 of	 an	 actor	 who	 carries	 out	 this	 work	 openly	 and	transparently.	 A	 cultural	 option	 such	 as	 the	 one	 underlying	 the	 Florentine	 clinics	 cannot	overlook	 the	 activity	 of	 a	 Court	 that	 has	 used	 its	 legal	 imagination	 to	 build	 the	 right	 to	economic	 social	 benefits	 under	 Article	 1	 of	 the	 First	 Protocol,	 which	 protects	 the	 right	 to	property,	 in	spite	of	 the	centuries-old	 liberal	 tradition	 that	opposed	the	right	 to	property	 to	social	rights.16	Finally,	 with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 justice,	 which	 defines	 the	 level	 of	 legal	 civilisation,	 it	should	be	remembered	that	the	Court	has,	on	a	theoretical	level,	severed	entitlement	to	rights	from	nationality,17	with	a	radically	legal-realist	approach,	but	also	shared	by	Kelsen,	who	saw	law	 as	 an	 order	 not	 supported	 by	 force,	 but	 regulating	 the	 use	 of	 force.	 This	 approach	 has	made	the	Court	itself	the	reference	point	for	many	non-European	citizens	who	could	not	bring	their	private	troubles	before	a	judge.	As	its	very	title	states,	the	Convention	declares	“Human	Rights”	and	the	Court	is	therefore	called	upon	to	guarantee	these	rights	to	all	human	beings.	Of	course,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	right	to	apply	to	the	Court	rests	with	anyone,	anywhere	in	the	world,	who	considers	that	one	of	his	rights	under	the	Convention	has	been	violated.	The	Convention	is	binding	only	on	the	 member	 states	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe.	 The	 Court	 therefore	 does	 not	 have	 universal	jurisdiction:	the	rights	of	the	Convention	are	not	always	enforceable	by	all	human	beings,	even	though	they	are	attributed	to	all	human	beings.	The	abstract	attribution	becomes	a	possibility	to	appeal,	and	its	protection	becomes	effective,	only	when	the	right	is	violated	by	an	official	of	a	state	party	to	the	Convention,	wherever	the	violation	occurs	and	whatever	human	being	is	the	 victim	 of	 the	 violation.	 Insofar	 as	 a	 right	 is	 a	 legal	 situation,	 a	 claim	 or	 an	 immunity	(Hohfeld	 1953,	 Ross	 1958,	 149-159)	whose	 legal	 protection	 is	 the	 possibility	 to	 apply	 to	 a	
                                                15	 In	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 transfer	 of	 experience	 to	 the	 students,	 various	 judges	 of	 the	 Court	 are	 called	 upon	 to	 participate	 in	Florence	in	the	work	of	the	clinic	and	are	part	of	the	juries	of	the	moot	court,	which	takes	place	in	French	or	English,	the	Court’s	vehicular	languages.	The	moot	court	is	students’	practical	activity.	We	also	try	to	bring	students	to	Strasbourg	to	attend	at	least	a	Grand	Chamber	hearing	and,	on	that	occasion,	we	also	organise	a	seminar	with	some	judges	of	the	Court.	16	See	the	leading	cases	Gaygusuz	v.	Austria,	1996,	Koua	Poirrez	v.	France,	1998	and	Konstantin	Markin	v.	Russia,	2012,	accessible	at	 the	 following	 links:	 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58060,	 http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/b942dc/,.	https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109868.	17	In	what	follows	I	propose	what	I	have	already	stated	in	Santoro	(2017),	with	little	change.	
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judge,	the	rights	established	by	the	Convention	exist,	i.e.	they	are	enforceable,	only	when	they	are	violated	by	officials	of	a	state	party	to	the	Convention	itself.18	For	 the	 first	 time,	 the	universal	nature	of	 rights	 is	matched	by	 the	actual	 and	systematic	possibility	of	 their	 judicial	 enforcement,	 regardless	of	 the	 right	holder’s	 state,	provided	 that	the	violation	is	committed	by	a	state	party	to	the	Convention.	A	final	reason	for	creating	the	clinic	on	the	protection	of	rights	before	the	ECtHR	was	that	there	 are	 still	 no	 courses	 in	 Italian	 universities	 specifically	 devoted	 to	 the	 Convention	 on	Human	Rights	“as	interpreted	by	the	Court”.	And	this	although	the	Convention	has	entered	the	Italian	 legal	 system	 from	 the	 top	 levels,	 “from	 the	 attic”	 if	 I	 may	 say	 so,	 through	 how	 the	Constitutional	 Court	 has	 created	 the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 117	 of	 the	 Italian	 Fundamental	Charter	 to	 frame	 the	 relationship	 between	 its	 case-law	 and	 that	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 to	substantiate	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	underpinning	the	relationship	between	state	law	and	conventional	law.	In	the	context	of	the	legal	clinics	created	to	develop	the	imagination	capable	of	making	marginal	people’s	personal	 troubles	 into	 legal	 claims,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	conventional	law	should	also	enter	the	Italian	legal	system	from	the	lower	levels,	I	would	say,	to	continue	with	the	metaphor,	“from	the	cellar”.	In	fact,	for	some	years	now,	by	introducing	a	case-law	 source	 into	 the	 Italian	 legal	 system	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 Article	 35-ter	 of	 the	Penitentiary	 Law	 has	 provided	 that	 a	 person	may	 ask	 the	 supervisory	magistrate	 or,	when	released,	 the	 civil	 judge	 for	 compensation	 for	 having	 been	 detained	 “in	 such	 detention	conditions	 as	 to	 violate	Article	3	of	 the	Convention	 for	 the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	 and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	 ratified	under	Law	No.	848	of	4	August	1955,	as	 interpreted	by	 the	
European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights”	 (italics	 of	 course	mine).	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 clinic	 on	 the	protection	of	 rights	by	 the	ECtHR	 is	 synergic	with	 the	 clinic	 on	 the	protection	of	 sentenced	people’s	rights.			
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